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A Discussion of Unigene Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Apotex, Inc.: The Standard for Prima Facie 
Obviousness of Pharmaceutical Formulation 
Claims in a Post-KSR World 
By Maria Doukas* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (KSR),1 the Supreme Court addressed 
obviousness in patent claims but failed to set forth a clear test for determining 
obviousness, particularly in the area of pharmaceutical patents.  In its ruling, the Court 
stated the following: (1) “the combination of familiar elements according to known 
methods is . . . obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results;”2 (2) if, at the 
time of the invention, a known problem existed and the patent encompasses an obvious 
solution to that problem, then the patent is obvious;
3
 and (3) if “there is a design need or 
market pressure to solve a problem” with a “finite number of identified, predictable 
solutions,” then the implementation of these solutions is the product of ordinary skill in 
the art and common sense, and not innovation.
4
  However, post-KSR cases have 
demonstrated that uncertainty remains as to the application of this ruling.  Further, as the 
disputed patent in KSR was a mechanical arts patent, there has been confusion as to how 
to apply this standard to pharmaceutical patents.    
¶2  This uncertainty is exemplified by the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Pfizer v. Apotex.5  
In this case, the Federal Circuit applied a strict reading of the standard set forth in KSR to 
hold that the pharmaceutical patent in question was obvious and therefore invalid.  The 
court stated that because the problem the patent set out to solve was known at the time of 
the invention and an identified solution was available in the prior art, a person of ordinary 
skill in the art would use this known solution to render the patented solution obvious.  
This strict reading of KSR was problematic because it did not allow courts to evaluate 
secondary considerations when looking at the obviousness of the patent.  Additionally the 
court disregarded the fact that the “known” solution was rarely used in the art.  After 
Pfizer, it appeared that pharmaceutical patents would be subject to a strict reading of the 
KSR obviousness standard.   
¶3  However, on August 25, 2011, the Federal Circuit in Unigene Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Apotex, Inc. (Unigene) departed from the strict reading of KSR it applied in Pfizer and 
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1
 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
2
 Id. at 416. 
3
 Id. at 419–20.  
4
 Id. at 402–03. 
5
  Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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instead set forth an enhanced standard for evaluating obviousness in pharmaceutical 
formulations.
6
  This standard looked at the functionality of one of the components of the 
pharmaceutical formulation to determine if the prior art rendered the formulation 
obvious.
7
  This enhanced standard was a departure from the standard the Federal Circuit 
applied in earlier pharmaceutical cases and may make it more difficult to invalidate 
pharmaceutical formulation claims as obvious.  This Note argues that the Federal Circuit 
was correct in setting forth this enhanced standard. 
¶4  This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part II briefly discusses what constitutes 
obviousness in patent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103.  This part addresses how the 





  Part III analyzes the Federal Circuit’s decision in Pfizer v. 
Apotex.
10
  Part IV analyzes the Federal Circuit’s decision in Unigene by examining the 
relevant facts of the case and the court’s rationale in determining nonobviousness of the 
patent claims.  Part V assesses the implications that Unigene will have on the future of 
pharmaceutical patents. 
II. OBVIOUSNESS IN PATENT CLAIMS 
¶5  The Constitution empowers Congress “To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Discoveries.”11  One of the requirements Congress has imposed in order for an invention 
to be patentable is that the invention be non-obvious.  This patentability condition of 
“nonobviousness” is codified in the 1952 Patent Act at 35 U.S.C. § 103.  This section 
currently states: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the 
claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the 
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing 
date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which 
the claimed invention pertains.
12
 
¶6  Despite the codification of the standard for obviousness, there is still considerable 
uncertainty concerning the distinction between what is patentable and what is “obvious.”  




 provide guidance 
regarding the standards for determining obviousness under § 103.  Despite these cases, 
there remains ambiguity for determining obviousness.  
 
6
 655 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1755 (2012). 
7
 Id. at 1364. 
8
 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
9
 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
10
 480 F.3d 1349 
11
 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
12
 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2013) (as amended as to matters unrelated to obviousness by Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act § 3(c), 125 Stat. at 287 (2011), effective 2013). 
13
 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
14
 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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¶7  In Graham, the Court ruled that while the ultimate question of patent validity is one 
of law, there are four basic factual inquiries that must be made under § 103.
15
  The four 
factual inquiries include: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) differences 
between the prior art and the claims at issue, (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent 
art, and (4) any evidence of secondary factors.
16
  These secondary factors include: 
commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, and the failure of others.
17
  These 




¶8  The Court in KSR reaffirmed the factual inquiries set forth in Graham while 
attempting to set forth a clearer standard for determining obviousness.  In KSR, Teleflex 
owned a patent that combined an adjustable automobile pedal with an electronic sensor.
19
  
Teleflex sued KSR for patent infringement after KSR developed an adjustable pedal 
system that had similar features to those in the Teleflex patent.
20
  In ruling on KSR’s 
summary judgment motion, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
applied the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (TSM) test that the Federal Circuit had 
previously applied in determining obviousness to grant KSR summary judgment.
21
  
Under the TSM test, a patent claim is obvious if the prior art, “the problem’s nature, or 
the knowledge of a person” with “ordinary skill in the art reveals some motivation or 
suggestion to combine the prior art” to teach the patent claims.22   
¶9  The district court applied the Graham factors to determine that there was “little 
difference” between the prior art and the patent claim at issue.23  Because of this, the 
court ruled that the TSM test was satisfied.  It reasoned that development within the 
industry would inevitably lead to the combination of sensors with adjustable pedals and 
the prior art provided the necessary basis for this combination.
24
  Thus, the district court 
held the patent invalid. 
¶10  However, on appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court ruling, finding 
that the court had not applied the TSM test strictly enough and that there were genuine 
issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment.
25
  The Federal Circuit reasoned 
that the prior art must address “the precise problem that the patentee was trying to 
solve.”26  Therefore, as the prior art references at issue did not address the problem the 
Teleflex patent was trying to solve, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have 
looked to these references to design the pedal as claimed.
27
  The court noted that even if it 
might have been obvious to combine the prior art references to form the pedal in the 
 
15






 MPEP § 2141(II) (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2011). 
19
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patented claim, this was irrelevant because the problem at issue in the Teleflex patent was 
not addressed in this prior art.
28
 
¶11  The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision, holding that the 
Federal Circuit applied a rigid, overly narrow test that was inconsistent with § 103 and 
the Court’s precedents.29  In its ruling, the Supreme Court made several observations that 
have had implications on subsequent patent infringement cases in regards to finding 
obviousness. 
¶12  First, the Court held that the “combination of familiar elements according to known 
methods is obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”30  The Court 
reasoned that if “a work is available in one field of an endeavor [then] design incentives 
and . . . market forces [would] prompt variations of it.”31  Therefore, if a person of 
ordinary skill in the art could implement a predictable variation, then § 103 bars its 
patentability.
32
  Most importantly, the Court stated that, “the analysis need not seek out 
precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a 
court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill 
in the art would employ.”33 
¶13  Second, the Court held that although the TSM test still has value, it should not be 
applied in the strict and rigid manner that the Federal Circuit had applied it.  The Court 
ruled that it is not the particular motivation or the avowed purpose of the patentee that 
controls, but is instead the objective reach of the claim that matters.
34
  The Court stated 
that if, at the time of the invention, a known problem existed and the patent’s claims 
encompass an obvious solution, then the patent’s subject matter can be proven obvious.35  
The Court noted that the Federal Circuit applied too strict a standard by holding that a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would look only to prior art designed to solve the same 
problem as the patent.
36
  The Court observed that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a 
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”37  Therefore, even if the prior art was 
not designed to solve the particular problem of the patent, this does not preclude it from 
being used to prove obviousness. 
¶14  Finally, the Court held that the Federal Circuit erred in finding that “a patent claim 
cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was 





 See id. 
30
 Id. at 401; see also Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976) (holding that when a patent 
“simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform” and 
yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious); United 
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51–52 (1966) (ruling that if elements in a patent work together in an 
unexpected and fruitful manner, the patent is non-obvious even if the patent claims a structure already 
known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the 
field).  
31




 Id. at 418. 
34
 Id. at 419. 
35




 Id.. at 421. 
38
 Id. at 402. 
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solve a problem and there are a finite number of indentified predictable solutions, [then] a 
person of ordinary skill in the art has [a] reason to pursue known options within his 
technical grasp.”39  Therefore, the implementation of one of these predictable solutions 




¶15  Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to set forth a clearer standard for determining 
obviousness in KSR, its opinion instead resulted in more confusion among practitioners 
about the obviousness standard.  This confusion is particularly acute in the area of 
pharmaceutical patents. Because KSR involved a mechanical arts patent, it is unclear how 
its holding should apply in the context of pharmaceutical patents.   
¶16  One source of this confusion is the inherent difference between patents directed 
towards mechanical arts, such as the patent in question in KSR, and patents directed 
towards pharmaceuticals.  For example, patents directed towards pharmaceuticals tend to 
be more complex and more unpredictable than patents directed towards the mechanical 
arts.
41
  This difference makes it harder to apply the obvious-to-try standard set forth in 
KSR to the more complex pharmaceutical cases.  For instance, the standard set forth in 
KSR holds that if a known problem existed at the time of the invention and the invention 
encompasses an obvious solution to that problem, then it is non-patentable.  While this 
standard may be readily applicable to a patent for a mechanical device, it is not as readily 
applicable to a pharmaceutical patent.  As a result, the Federal Circuit has been cautious 
in how it applies KSR in these types of cases.
42
 
III. PHARMACEUTICAL CASES POST-KSR: PFIZER V. APOTEX 
¶17  The uncertainty caused by the ruling in KSR in regards to pharmaceutical patent 
cases is exemplified by the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Pfizer v. Apotex.43  The decision in 
Pfizer was the Federal Circuit’s first obviousness case following KSR, and it starkly 
contrasts with the decision recently issued by the Federal Circuit in Unigene v. Apotex.
44
   
¶18  In Pfizer, Pfizer Inc. obtained a patent for the drug Norvasc®, which contains 
amlodipine besylate.
45
  Prior to the use of this patent, Pfizer had invented amlodipine (a 
dihydropyridine) and discovered its anti-hypertensive and anti-ischemic pharmacological 
properties.
46
  It had obtained a U.S. patent for “certain dihydropyridine compounds and 
their pharmaceutically-acceptable acid addition salts.”47  This previously issued patent 
stated “that the pharmaceutically-acceptable acid addition salts of amlodipine ‘are those 
formed from acids which form non-toxic acid addition salts containing pharmaceutically 





 Id. at 402–03. 
41
 Katherine M.L. Hayes, Three Years Post-KSR: A Practitioner’s Guide to “Winning” Arguments on 
Obviousness and a Look at What May Lay Ahead, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 243, 253 (2010). 
42
 Id. at 243. 
43
 Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
44
 Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 
1755 (2012). 
45
 Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1353. 
46
 Id.  
47
 Id. 
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phosphate, acetate, maleate, fumarate, lactate, tartrate, citrate and gluconate salts,’ and 
the preferred salt is maleate.”48  This patent did not mention the use of besylate as an 
acceptable anion.  Because of issues with chemical instability and stickiness of the tablet 
blend when maleate was the anion that was used, Pfizer developed the amlodipine 
besylate formulation and obtained a patent for this formulation.
49
 
¶19  Before the expiration of Pfizer’s patent, Apotex filed an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seeking 
approval to commercially sell amlodipine besylate tablets.
50
  As a result, Pfizer filed a 
patent infringement action against Apotex, and Apotex counterclaimed that Pfizer’s 
patent was invalid due to obviousness.
51
  Although the district court rejected Apotex’s 
claim that the patent was invalid due to obviousness,
52
 the Federal Circuit reversed, 




¶20  In making this determination, the Federal Circuit noted that one of ordinary skill in 
the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art references to produce the 
amlodipine besylate of the claims.
54
  Pfizer argued that the use of besylate in the 
formulation would not have been obvious, as the prior art reference that mentioned the 
use of besylate stated that it was “one of the most rarely used anions in the 
pharmaceutical industry, as only 0.25% of approved drugs . . . were besylate salts.”55  
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by this argument.   
¶21  First, the Federal Circuit noted that a skilled chemist at the time would have the 
ability to make salts of acceptable quality in the industry by using known ingredients.
56
  
As “the genus of FDA-approved anions at the time was small,” the fact that besylate was 
used as an anion only 0.25% of the time was not highly probative or dispositive.
57
  The 
court seemingly ignored the fact that besylate was not a commonly used anion and 
concluded that the fact that it was listed as an FDA-approved anion would make it 
reasonable for one of ordinary skill in the art to use to develop the amlodipine besylate 
formulation of Pfizer’s patent. 
¶22  In addition, the Federal Circuit noted the favorable qualities of besylate, such as 
acid strength and solubility, in determining obviousness.
58
  The court acknowledged that 
none of the prior art references that suggested the use of besylate salt in the 
pharmaceutical described the pharmaceutical for treating hypertension or angina, which 
is what Pfizer’s drug was used to treat.59  However, the court ruled that this was 
unimportant because the besylate portion of the acid addition salt has no therapeutic 





 Id. at 1353–54. 
50




 Id. at 1356. 
53
 Id. at 1358–59. 
54
 Id. at 1364. 
55













  Therefore, the Federal Circuit reasoned that because besylate had the 
favorable characteristics listed above, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
been motivated to choose besylate as the anion in the salt.
61
     
¶23  This reasoning by the Federal Circuit appears to indicate that pharmaceutical 
patents are affected by the decision in KSR and therefore may be more susceptible to 
findings of obviousness that were not found under the TSM standard that was routinely 
applied by the Federal Circuit before KSR.
62
  The Court in KSR had ruled that if “there is 
a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there is a finite number of 
identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill in the art has reason to pursue 
the known options within his or her technical grasp.”63  Therefore, the implementation of 
these solutions is the product of ordinary skill and common sense, not innovation.
64
  
Further, in KSR the Court ruled that although the TSM test still has value, it should not be 
applied too strictly.  The Court noted that if a known problem existed at the time of the 
invention, and the patent’s claims encompass an obvious solution, then the patent fails to 
satisfy § 103’s nonobviousness requirement.65   
¶24  In this case, there was a design need and a known problem, as Pfizer’s old 
formulation that used maleate instead of besylate had chemical instability problems and 
tablet sticking problems.
66
  The Federal Circuit, in applying the teaching of KSR, 
therefore seemingly disregarded the rarity of using besylate as the anion in the salt 
formulation.  The court instead reasoned that because there existed a known problem with 
the maleate and a design need to work around it as the anion used in the formulation, the 
fact that besylate is listed as a potential anion in the prior art would be enough to lead 
someone of ordinary skill in the art to use it in formulating the pharmaceutical.  As will 
be discussed later in Part IV, this reasoning starkly contrasts with the Federal Circuit’s 
subsequent reasoning in Unigene.
 
 
¶25  In addition to looking at the motivation to combine, the Federal Circuit looked at 
the Graham factor of secondary considerations and ruled that the patent claims were 
obvious.  Pfizer had argued the use of besylate in the formulation yielded unexpected 
results and provided a pharmaceutical composition that was “sufficiently nonsticky to 
obtain commercial processability,” which indicated the pharmaceutical was not an 
obvious formulation.
67
  The Federal Circuit noted that although evidence of unexpected 
results can be used to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness,
68
 “this secondary 
consideration does not overcome the strong showing of obviousness in the case.”69  
 
60




  See Scott D. Locke & William D. Schmidt, Protecting Pharmaceutical Inventions in a KSR World, 
50 IDEA 1, 21 (2009) (“The trend since the KSR decision appears that, at least initially, claims for 
enhancing bioavailability by processing techniques or changing how the pharmaceutical is taken would be 
viewed as obvious particularly if they utilize known techniques or methods to administer the 
pharmaceutical.”). 
63
 KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007). 
64
 Id. at 402–03. 
65
 Id. at 419–20. 
66
 Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1353–54. 
67
 Id. at 1370 (internal quotation omitted). 
68
 Id. at 1369 (citing In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
69
 Id. at 1372. 
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Furthermore, the court noted that there is no evidence that the results were unexpected, as 
Pfizer failed to provide “any evidence of what the skilled artisan would have expected.”70  
The Federal Circuit reasoned that, since besylate was listed as one possible anion in the 
prior art, it would be expected that some of the anions listed in the prior art would have 
superior properties and some would have inferior properties; therefore, the successful use 
of besylate would not be an unexpected result.
71
 
¶26  This consideration of secondary factors and resulting conclusion of obviousness 
aligns with a strict reading of KSR.  In KSR, the Court ruled that “the combination of 
familiar elements . . . is . . . obvious when it does no more than yield predictable 
results.”72  In this case, the Federal Circuit ruled that the successful use of besylate would 
not be unexpected simply because it is one of the listed anions that has been used in 
pharmaceutical formulations and, according to the Court, it would be expected that some 
of those anions would have superior properties.
73
  The Federal Circuit’s determination of 
what would qualify as expected results in Pfizer again stands in stark contrast with its 
ruling in Unigene, as will be discussed in Part IV. 
¶27  After Pfizer, some courts continued to apply this stricter standard in pharmaceutical 
cases.  For example, in McNeil-PPC v. Perrigo, the district court ruled the patent was 
obvious, even in light of unexpected results and commercial success with the patent.
74
  
However, the Federal Circuit, along with other courts, did not follow this stricter standard 
of Pfizer.  For example, in Takeda Chemical Industries v. Alphapharm, the court found 
the patent nonobvious by applying a pre-KSR test for obviousness: the lead compound 
analysis.
75
  The court ruled that even though the prior art taught the compound at issue, 
since the art taught away from using this compound and suggested that other compounds 
would be more successful, the patent was valid.
76
  The court distinguished its ruling from 
Pfizer by saying the prior art in this case required choosing from over ninety different 
compounds, whereas in Pfizer it only involved fifty-three pharmaceutically-acceptable 
anions narrowed down to a few, including the one chosen to be used in the patent.
77
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF UNIGENE V. APOTEX 
¶28  After the decision in Pfizer, uncertainty remained regarding nonobviousness in 
pharmaceutical patents.  In August 2011, the Federal Circuit appeared to set forth an 
enhanced standard for addressing obviousness in pharmaceutical patents in its decision in 
Unigene v. Apotex. 
¶29  In Unigene, the Federal Circuit held that the patent claims at issue were not obvious 
in light of the prior art.
78
  Unigene Laboratories, Inc., owns the patent for the drug 
 
70




 KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. 
73
 Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1371. 
74
 516 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
75
 Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
76
 Id. at 1359. 
77
 Id. at 1359–60. 
78
 Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 
1755 (2012). 




, a nasal spray with the active ingredient salmon calcitonin.
79
  Unigene filed a 
New Drug Application (NDA) for Fortical
®
 and claimed Miacalcin
®
, a drug marketed by 
Novartis International AG, as its reference drug.
80
  Both of these drugs use salmon 
calcitonin as their active ingredient, but each has a different formulation.
81
  The important 
formulation difference is that Miacalcin
®
 uses benzalkonium chloride (BZK) as a 
preservative, absorption enhancer, and surfactant, whereas Fortical
®
 uses 20 mM of citric 
acid as an absorption enhancer and stabilizer/buffer, polyoxyethylene(2) sorbitan 




¶30  The issue arose when Apotex filed an ANDA with the FDA to sell a generic 
version of Fortical
®
 before Unigene’s patent expired.83  Unigene filed an infringement 
action against Apotex, and Apotex alleged there was no infringement due to patent 
invalidity under § 103.
84
  The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled 
that “no prior art teaches the use of 20 mM citric acid to achieve ‘both shelf stability and 
enhanced bioavailability’ in a nasal salmon calcitonin formulation” and that it would not 




¶31  Affirming the district court’s ruling, the Federal Circuit restated the standard set 
forth in KSR: that obviousness requires the showing that a person of ordinary skill in the 
art would have selected and combined the prior art references during the normal course of 
research and development to yield the claimed invention.
86
  However, the Federal Circuit 
further noted “when design need and market pressure may dictate a commonsensical path 
using a finite number of indentified predictable solutions to one of ordinary skill, 
deviations from that path are likely products of innovation.”87 
¶32  One of the main focuses of the Federal Circuit in determining nonobviousness was 
the inclusion of 20 mM of citric acid in the patent claim.  The Federal Circuit not only 
focused on the concentration of citric acid that was claimed, it also focused on the 
functionality of the citric acid as an absorption enhancer and stabilizer/buffer, even 
though functionality was not explicitly laid out in the claim language. 
¶33  Apotex argued that this claim was obvious in light of the reference drug Miacaclin® 
and other prior art references.
88
  One prior art reference that Apotex cited was U.S. Patent 
No. 5,912,014 (filed Mar. 15, 1996) (’014 patent).89  The ’014 patent claimed a solid oral 
dosage of salmon calcitonin that uses citric acid, but at much higher concentrations than 
 
79




 Id. at 1355–56. 
82






 Id. at 1358. 
86
 See id. at 1360 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)); see also Bayer 
Schering Pharma AG v. Barr Labs., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(“The statutory criterion is whether the invention would have been obvious to persons of ordinary skill at 
the time of the invention, not whether it is sufficiently simple to appear obvious to judges after the 
discovery is finally made . . . .”). 
87
 Unigene, 655 F.3d at 1361. 
88
 Id. at 1362. 
89
 Id.  
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the 20 mM claimed.
90
  Further, the ’014 patent examined using citric acid for 
bioavailibity, but it was examined in the context of a liquid injection into a rat duodenum 
and not for human use in liquid pharmaceutical formulations.
91
  The Federal Circuit 
reasoned that because the concentration of citric acid in the ’014 patent was much higher 
than the 20 mM in the claim, and the use of citric acid for bioavailability was not in the 
liquid pharmaceutical formulation context, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not 
have used 20 mM of citric acid in place of the BZK in Miacalcin
®
 during the normal 
course of research and development.
92
 
¶34  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted that even though another prior art reference 
(U.S. Patent No. 5,124,315 (filed June 17, 1991) (’315 patent)) teaches the use of 20.5 
mM of citric acid in a liquid nasal salmon calcitonin formulation, since the patent clearly 
states the citric acid was not used as an absorption enhancing agent, but instead was only 
used as the acidic component of the buffer, one of ordinary skill in the art would not use 
this citric acid as a BZK substitute.
93
  In its reasoning, the Federal Circuit therefore 
imparts functionality into the claims when it is not explicitly stated and uses this 
functionality to determine nonobviousness.  Although the concentration of citric acid 
used in the liquid nasal salmon calcitonin formulation of the ’315 patent is about 20 mM, 
as claimed in Unigene’s patent, the Federal Circuit emphasized the fact that the citric acid 
in this prior art was used only as a buffer, not as an absorption enhancing agent as it was 
in Unigene’s formulation.  
¶35  Finally, the Federal Circuit also rejected obviousness claims based on the prior art 
reference of U.S. Patent No. 4,476,116 (filed Dec. 10, 1982) (’116 patent), which was 
directed towards nasal compositions with enhanced peptide absorption.
94
  In the ’116 
patent, citric acid is listed as a potential absorption agent.
95
  However, the Federal Circuit 
found that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have used citric acid as an absorption 
agent based on this reference because citric acid is one of over fifty options listed in the 
patent.
96
  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit reasoned that since the ’315 patent mentioned 
the absorption agent options of the ’116 patent but stated they yielded discouraging 
results, one of ordinary skill in the art would not have considered 20 mM of citric acid as 
a suitable absorption agent in the liquid nasal formulation of salmon calcitonin.
97
 
¶36  The Federal Circuit’s decision in Unigene represents a departure from its earlier 
reasoning in Pfizer.  In Pfizer, the court found that replacing maleate as the anion in the 
formulation with besylate was obvious in light of the prior art references, even though the 
prior art stated that besylate was only used 0.25% of the time in pharmaceutical 
formulations.
98
  However, in Unigene, the Federal Circuit did not find it was obvious to 
use citric acid as an absorption enhancer, even though it was listed as such in the prior art 
reference to the ‘116 patent.99  In this case, the Federal Circuit refused to find 
 
90












 Id. at 1364. 
97
 Id. at 1363. 
98
 KSR, 480 F.3d at, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
99
 Unigene, 655 F.3d at 1363. 
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obviousness because citric acid was one of fifty potential absorption enhancers listed in 
the prior art.
100
  The court noted that not only was citric acid one of many potential 
absorption enhancers listed, it also yielded discouraging test results during 
experimentation.
101
  As a result, the Federal Circuit in this case refused to find that one of 
ordinary skill in the art would have used citric acid in the formulation as an absorption 
enhancer.   
¶37  The Federal Circuit demonstrated differing analytical approaches in Pfizer and 
Unigene: in Pfizer, the court focused on the presence of a component to find obviousness, 
whereas in Unigene, the court determined that mere presence was insufficient to show 
obviousness.  Consequently, the Unigene approach appears to be a departure from the 
strict reading of the ruling in KSR applied by the Federal Circuit in Pfizer.  In KSR, the 
Court stated that if, at the time of the invention, a known problem existed and the patent 
claims encompassed an obvious solution, then the patent can be proven obvious.
102
  The 
Court in KSR further noted that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary 
creativity, not an automaton, ”103 and therefore, the fact that prior art was not designed to 
solve the particular problem of the patent does not preclude it from being used to prove 
obviousness.
104
 The Unigene court appears to revert towards a stricter TSM test and away 
from the ruling in KSR.    
¶38  Additionally, in Pfizer, the Federal Circuit looked at whether the use of besylate 
instead of maleate would produce unexpected results that would render the claim 
nonobvious.  The court determined that because besylate was listed in the prior art as one 
potential anion that can be used in that type of salt formulation, there were no unexpected 
results.  Therefore, the claim was obvious.  The court did not look closely at the 
functionality of the besylate and maleate to determine if the substitution would be 
nonobvious.  On the other hand, in Unigene, the Federal Circuit paid close attention to 
the functionality of the components and determined that the patent claims were 
nonobvious because of the function the citric acid performed within the formulation.   
¶39  This focus on functionality is particularly interesting because functionality was not 
part of Unigene’s claim language.  The claim itself listed the components of the 
pharmaceutical formulation and the concentrations of each component within the 
formulation.  However, nowhere in the claim was there a mention of the functionality of 
each component.  Instead, it appears that the Federal Circuit read functional language into 
the claims from the specification, and then used this as evidence to determine that the 
prior art did not render the claims obvious.  This reasoning constitutes a definite 
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 See Unigene v. Apotex: Federal Circuit Discusses Standard for Prima Facie Obviousness of 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF UNIGENE V. APOTEX ON THE FUTURE OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 
¶40  Unigene appears to set forth an enhanced standard for determining obviousness in 
pharmaceutical patent claims.  The court in Pfizer did not address the intricacies of 
designing pharmaceutical formulations and instead solely focused on whether 
components of the pharmaceutical formulation were mentioned in the prior art.  
However, in Unigene, the court looked beyond whether the components were mentioned 
in the prior art and focused on the functionality of the components.  While Unigene did 
not expressly overrule the decision in Pfizer, it appears that the Federal Circuit now 
recognizes the inherent complexities and challenges involved in pharmaceutical patents 
and has articulated a standard that appropriately addresses these challenges.   
¶41  For example, in both Pfizer and Unigene, the patent claims at issue were for 
pharmaceutical formulations that were each derived from chemically similar drugs that 
were known in the prior art.
106
  Each of these cases illustrates how even small chemical 
differences in the structure and chemical makeup of a pharmaceutical formulation can 
have therapeutic implications.
107
  Because of the potential therapeutic advantages that 
could arise from modifying chemically similar drugs, the FDA Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research awards these “chemically similar pharmaceutical candidates 
expedited review status,”108 incentivizing the research and development of these drugs.109  
¶42  As seen in Pfizer, however, patents directed towards chemically similar drugs that 
have substantial structural similarity to the previously known compound can lead to a 
rejection for obviousness.
110
  The problem with this rejection under obviousness is that 
pharmaceutical companies are not as likely to invest in research and development to 
produce new drugs if they feel that the drugs will not be eligible for patent protection.
111
  
Therefore, the need to remove patents that are truly obvious and non-innovative from the 
market must be balanced against the need to avoid a prohibitively high standard in the 
patent process that may stunt scientific research and development. 
¶43  One further problem with the ruling in Pfizer was the Federal Circuit’s implicit 
application of the “obvious to try” standard to reject the claims as obvious.  Briefly, the 
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 See 655 F.3d at 1355–56 (Fortical® was derived from the reference drug Miacaclin® but replaced the 
BZK of Miacaclin
®
 with citric acid, polysorbate 80, phenylethyl alcohol and benzyl alcohol.  The 
patentable feature was found to be the concentration of citric acid claimed); 480 F.3d at 1353 (explaining 
that Norvasc
®
 was an amlodipine besylate drug that was a modification of the patented amlodipine drugs. 
The patentable feature Pfizer tried to claim was the replacement of maleate as the preferred anion with 
besylate).   
107
  See Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. 
FOUND. 4–10 (2002), http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/innovations.pdf.  In addition to approving new molecular 
entities (i.e. medicines containing active ingredients that have never before been approved for the U.S. 
market), the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also approves new products whose active 
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than the original medication. 
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 Andrew V. Trask, "Obvious to Try": A Proper Patentability Standard in the Pharmaceutical Arts?, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2625, 2627 (2008). 
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110
 See 480 F.3d at 1363–64; see also MPEP § 2144.09 (8th ed. Rev. 6, Sept. 2007) (“A prima facie case 
of obviousness may be made when chemical compounds have very close structural similarites and similar 
utilities.”). 
111
 See BERNICE SCHACTER, THE NEW MEDICINES: HOW DRUGS ARE CREATED, APPROVED, MARKETED 
AND SOLD 52 (2006); see also C. MERLE CRAWFORD, DEFINING THE CHARTER FOR PRODUCT INNOVATION 
IN GENERATING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 163, 175 (Edward B. Roberts ed., 1987). 
Vol. 11:5] Maria Doukas 
 469 
obvious to try test as applied in the pharmaceutical industry focused on whether it would 
have been obvious to chemically modify a prior art pharmaceutical compound to arrive at 
the claimed compound.
112
  However, this standard tends to discount whether a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would have possessed any “reasonable expectation of success” 
when modifying the compound.
113
  In Pfizer, although there was no indication in the prior 
art that besylate salt of amlodipine was anything but merely obvious to try, the Federal 
Circuit still ruled that it would not only have been obvious to try, but also obvious to 
make.
114
  This seemingly disregarded the prior art that stated that the use of besylate as an 
anion in pharmaceutical formulations was rare,
115
 as well as the undisputed testimony 
that the advantageous properties of amlodipine besylate could not have been predicted.
116
 
¶44  The danger of this obvious to try standard is that it might hamper future 
pharmaceutical research by removing an incentive for researchers to develop new 
pharmaceutical drugs.  There are high costs associated with pharmaceutical research, and 
if researchers feel they will not obtain patent protection, then there will be no impetus to 
pursue that particular research.
117
  Also, an easier invalidation process due to obviousness 
might make it more difficult to exclude generics from the market.
118
  Because the 
pharmaceutical industry is dependent upon patent protection to exclude generic 
competitors from the market,
119
 this could have negative ramifications for the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
¶45  The approach the Federal Circuit took in Unigene is more beneficial to the 
pharmaceutical industry as a whole precisely because of the dangers of the strict standard 
applied in Pfizer.  In Unigene, the court did not apply an obvious to try standard and 
instead implemented a stricter standard in determining obviousness by requiring the 
functionality of the components in the prior art to match up to the functionality of the 
component in the patent claim.
120
   
¶46  If the Federal Circuit in Unigene had approached the prior art and the patent claim 
as it had in Pfizer, it most likely would have found the claim to be obvious based on the 
prior art of record, since the prior art mentioned using citric acid in a salmon calcitonin 
liquid nasal formulation—the patent claim—and it taught using this citric acid in a 
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similar concentration to that which was claimed.  However, the Federal Circuit in 
Unigene instead focused heavily on the fact that the prior art that mentioned using citric 
acid in about the same concentration as that used in the patent claims neglected to teach 
that it was used as an absorption enhancer.
121
 
¶47  This focus on functionality was not seen in Pfizer and is even more interesting 
given that the functionality of the components is not part of the claim language itself.  In 
the examination of patents to determine obviousness, it is the claim language that is 
important and the determinitive factor of what will be actually patented.
122
  Furthermore, 
although the specification is relevant as it might provide explanation for claims, the 
actual patented subject matter is that which is set forth in the claim language, not the 
specification.
123
  Therefore, when the Federal Circuit in Unigene ruled that the patented 
claim was valid despite the prior art teaching the use of citric acid in a similar 
concentration to that in the patented claim, it was imparting limitations from the 
specification into the claim language.  The Federal Circuit reasoned that because the prior 
art failed to teach that citric acid could function as an absorption enhancer, it was not 
relevant to the obviousness inquiry.  This analytical shift by the Federal Circuit to impart 
limitations from the specification into the claim language could have interesting 
repercussions on the field of patent law, especially if applied to other industries.   
¶48  By imparting functionality that is listed in the specification into the claim language 
itself, the Federal Circuit goes against the interpretation of claim language that is set forth 
in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP)
124
 of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).  According to the MPEP, claims are to be “given their 
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.”125  However, the 
reading of limitations from the specification into the claim is found to be an 
impermissible importation of subject matter from the specification into the claim.
126
  
Therefore, the imparting of functionality into the claim language could be argued to be in 
opposition to the standards set forth by the MPEP. 
¶49  Although imparting functionality may be a necessary approach to use in the field of 
pharmaceutical patents due to their inherent complexity, this same approach should not 
be applied in other fields (i.e. mechanical arts). Such an approach would result in an 
overly limiting model that would render it more difficult to find patents obvious in the 
mechanical arts, even when they should be found obvious.  The requirement that 
functionality align in both the prior art and the patent at issue in the mechanical field is 
not as necessary as requiring the same alignment in the pharmaceutical industry because 
mechanical patents do not face the same design challenges as pharmaceutical patents. 
¶50  Another reason that the enhanced standard set forth in Unigene is useful in the 
pharmaceutical patent context is that it might make it harder to invalidate pharmaceutical 
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124
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Vol. 11:5] Maria Doukas 
 471 
patents for obviousness.  This is particularly relevant in the pharmaceutical context 
because industries that work toward developing new drugs have a great need for patent 
protection.
127
  One reason for this is the great cost associated with research and 
development of a new pharmaceutical.
128
  Also, the FDA requires a long and rigorous set 
of tests for companies to pass before they can release a pharmaceutical into the market.
129
  
Because of this, pharmaceutical research is an inherently uncertain discipline.
130
   
¶51  As proposed by Professor Merges, obviousness should be viewed as a function of 
uncertainty, and when uncertainty is high, the courts should moderately lower the 
standard of patentability to compensate for the risk of failure.
131
  The enhanced standard 
set forth in Unigene, which makes it more difficult to invalidate a patent based on 
obviousness, seems to provide this lower standard of patentability that compensates for 
the uncertainty of pharmaceuticals.   
¶52  On the other hand, it can be argued that this sliding scale method of compensating 
for uncertainty suffers from defects, because it establishes a standard that differs from 
industry to industry.  Other industries, aside from the pharmaceutical industry, also have 
high uncertainty and arguably should be given more leeway in standards for obviousness.  
This issue is just one of many challenges patent litigators and courts will likely face in the 
future as post-KSR standards for obviousness and industry-specific standards are 
challenged.   
¶53  In regards to the pharmaceutical industry, the court’s recognition in Unigene of the 
high uncertainty involved in pharmaceutical patents should result in a lower standard for 
patentability. This will facilitate the process for pharmaceutical companies to obtain 
patent protection for their products.  As noted above, this standard could have a negative 
impact, as it might result in a greater bar to generics entering the market.  However, the 
positive results for society—namely, strengthened incentives for pharmaceutical research 
and development—seem to outweigh these negatives.  Because the cost of research and 
development in the pharmaceutical area is so great, a company that is more likely to 
obtain patent protection will be more likely to invest time and resources into developing 
new drugs.  This will drive innovation in the pharmaceutical arena and provides society 
with beneficial new treatments. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶54  The enhanced standard set forth in Unigene v. Apotex for determining obviousness 
in pharmaceutical formulations was a step in the right direction for the Federal Circuit.  
The previous standard established in KSR created uncertainty in determining obviousness 
in the world of pharmaceutical patents that was problematic for the industry as a whole, 
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as patents are incredibly important to the innovation of new drugs.  The decision in 
Pfizer, reached shortly after KSR, exemplified the uncertainty left by the Supreme Court 
in determining obviousness in pharmaceutical patent cases.  The court in Pfizer applied a 
strict reading of KSR to the pharmaceutical patent in question to find it obvious, leaving 
doubt in the minds of pharmaceutical researchers as to whether obtaining patent 
protection for their new pharmaceutical products would be problematic.  The Federal 
Circuit did not set forth a clear obviousness standard until the most recent decision in 
Unigene. 
¶55  Unigene not only sets forth an enhanced standard, it also appears to make it more 
difficult to invalidate pharmaceutical patents as obvious.  Focusing the inquiry on the 
functionality of the components in the prior art relative to the functionality of the 
components in the patent adds an extra protection against a finding of obviousness for 
pharmaceutical patents.  Furthermore, the court in Unigene, unlike the court in Pfizer, 
considered experimentation results by finding nonobviousness when there would be 
unexpected results generated by the use of a particular compound.  Thus, the resulting 
standard established in Unigene improves upon the previous standard because it both 
enhances the clarity of the test and provides appropriate protection for research and 
development within the pharmaceutical industry.  Moving forward, the Federal Circuit 
and the lower courts should continue to apply this enhanced standard and not be as quick 
to render pharmaceutical formulation claims non-obvious. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
